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We carried out simulations of various scenarios for bioterrorist attacks using smallpox occurring in a 
virtual area set up on the basis of the census of Okayama-city, Japan, which predict the effect of control 
strategies against bioterrorism and the loss scale. On simulating a smallpox epidemic, we followed the 
method of the Individual Based Model stochastically, which can treat the population in the virtual area as 
individuals. Individuals have personal information, behavior patterns, and interactions among social 
groups. We took into consideration the influence of residual immunity due to past vaccination. We 
considered Traced Vaccination (TV) and Mass Vaccination (MV) strategies against bioterrorism. We 
investigated the effect of TV and MV strategies on the suppression of smallpox epidemics. Consequently, 
the TV strategy was found to have higher effectiveness than the MV strategy. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In recent years, a lot of terrorist attacks have occurred 
around the world. The weapons for the use of bioterror 
are easily and inexpensively manufactured, so that 
bioterrorism is regarded as a significant threat. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) shows smallpox as one of 
the biological weapons with the highest infectiousness 
and mortality rate (Center for Disease Control, 2001). WHO 
declared that smallpox was eradicated from the world in 
1980. In Japan, smallpox was eradicated in 1956. 
Consequently, regular vaccination for smallpox finished 
in Japan in 1976, therefore the population of non-immune 
younger people has increased since then (Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare, 2006). Although it is said that 
variola (smallpox) virus exists only in laboratories in the 
USA and Russia, it is predicted that variola virus may 
escape from these laboratories in the future (Fenner et al., 
1988). We carried out simulations of various scenarios for 
bioterrorist attacks using smallpox occurring in a virtual 
area set up on the basis of the census of Okayama-city, 
Japan, which predict the effect of control strategies 
against bioterrorism and the loss scale. 
Fennner et al. (1988) reviewed the symptoms and the 
history of eradication of smallpox. For control strategies 
against bioterrorism, Kaplan et al. (2003) carried out a 
comparative study among Traced Vaccination (TV) and 
Mass Vaccination (MV) strategies by a deterministic 
model. Nishiura et al. (2004) investigated the influence of 
residual immunity on a smallpox epidemic initiated by 
bioterrorists. Longini et al. (2007) analyzed various 
scenarios in cooperation with historical research resulting 
in severity based on an Individual Based Model (IBM). 
In simulating smallpox epidemics stochastically in this 
article, we followed the IBM method, which can treat the 
population as individuals. Every individual has personal 
information about age, home address, behavior patterns
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such as movement between home and workplace, and 
interaction among social groups. The course of a 
smallpox epidemic is simulated by the processes of 
infection, severity, death, and vaccination of each 
individual followed from probability distributions (See 
next section). We considered TV and MV strategies 
against bioterrorism. TV, which is recommended by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevalence (CDC) in the 
United States, traces and vaccinates persons who came 
into contact with patients (Center for Disease Control, 2001). 
On the other hand, MV doses all persons in a certain area 
with vaccine irrespective of contact with patients. We 
also considered the influence of three stage residual 
immunity due to past vaccination. In Japan, the majority 
of people born after 1977, between 1970 and 1976, and 
before 1969 have been vaccinated zero, once, and more 
than two times, respectively. In this article, we introduce 
a virtual area where the age structures, the number of 
social settings, etc. are referenced from the census of 
Okayama-city, Japan. We arranged 10 scenarios with the 
execution of TV, MV, and both TV and MV 
simultaneously with three lengths of necessary tracing 
time for TV, two kinds ranges for MV-blocks, and two 
kinds of behavior patterns of patients.  
We compared the spread of smallpox epidemics over 10 
scenarios for the five index patients introduced at the 
beginning of each trial with the average number of total 
infections, deaths, doses of vaccine, and percentage of 
eradication of the virus within 100 days in 100 
simulations. The simulation results showed that the TV 
strategy reduced the average number of total infections 
and deaths to 30% and 10% compared with a no-control  
scenario, and can eradicate the smallpox epidemic within 
100 days in all 100 trials. While the MV strategy reduced 
the average number of total infections and deaths only to 
73% and 69% compared with the no-control scenario, 
and eradicated the outbreak within 100 days in only 59 
trials. This result showed a higher effectiveness of the TV 
strategy on the suppression of a smallpox epidemic 
caused by a bioterrorist attack. 
 
2 Materials and Methods 
 
2.1 Natural history of smallpox 
The progression stages of smallpox are separated into 
five stages, which are, susceptible, incubation, fever, rash, 
and recover, according to the symptoms (Fenner et al., 
1988). The patients of smallpox are classified into three 
types: ordinary, modified, and hemorrhagic, according to 
their severity. The modified type patients who have 
relaxed symptoms may spread more smallpox infection 
because of the difficulty in recognizing the infection.  
Hemorrhagic type patients are recognized as having 
severe symptoms and high infectiousness and mortality. 
The incubation period of smallpox, which is dependent 
on severity type, lasts 7-17 and 7-15 days with means of 
11.48 and 10.24 days for ordinary/modified types and 
hemorrhagic type, respectively (Fig. 1) (Fenner et al., 1988). 
Fever and rash periods last 1.5-4.5 and 4.5-12.5 days, 
respectively (Fenner et al., 1988). The infectiousness of 
smallpox is dependent on both severity type and 
infection stage (Fenner et al., 1988). Hemorrhagic type 
patients have the highest infectiousness, and the modified 
type patients have the lowest infectiousness. Smallpox 
 
Fig. 1 The distribution of incubation  
(a) ordinary and modified types, (b) hemorrhagic type (Fenner et al., 1988). 
(a) (b) 
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patients in the early rash period have the highest 
infectiousness, and those in the period just before rash 
appearance have the lowest infectiousness (Fenner et al., 
1988). Fatality occurs in patients 7-17 days after fever, 
and other smallpox patients recover after the rash period 
has finished (Fenner et al., 1988). 
 
2.2 Infection model of smallpox 
In the model, the population in the model for 
transmission of smallpox are divided into six 
epidemiological classes, that is, susceptible, incubation, 
fever, rash, death, and recover. The susceptible class is 
subdivided into three subclasses based on residual 
immunity: individuals in subclasses A, B, and C have 
been vaccinated zero, once, and more than two times, 
respectively. The model scheme for the transmission 
dynamics of smallpox is shown in Fig. 2. The individuals 
born after 1977, between 1970 and 1976, and before 
1969 belong to subclasses A, B, and C, respectively 
(Nishiura et al., 2004). The fever and the rash periods were 
estimated at 3 and 11 days, respectively (Longini et al., 
2007). The days from infection to death for ordinary and 
modified type patients were distributed uniformly across 
7-14 days. All hemorrhagic type patients end in death on 
the 11th day after infection (Longini et al., 2007). 
Mortalities of ordinary, modified, and hemorrhagic types 
patients were assumed as 0.3, 0.1, and 1.0, respectively 
(Longini et al., 2007). The infectiousness of smallpox, 
which is dependent on both severity types and progress 
in infection is tabulated in Table 1. We introduce the Base 
ratio and multipliers to express infectiousness on the 2nd 
day of the fever stage, and the relative infectiousness of 
ordinary and the others type patients (Table 1). 
 
2.3 Efficacy of vaccination 
The efficacy of the vaccine for smallpox, which is 
dependent on both susceptible subclasses and elapsed 
time from infection is tabulated in Table 2 (Fenner et al., 
1988). Vaccination for individuals in the susceptible and 
incubation classes within 4 days from infection is 
extremely effective, while vaccination for individuals in 
incubation or fever classes within 5-7 days after infection 
is imperfect and vaccination for those after 8 days from 
infection ineffective, respectively. The additional death 
rate caused by vaccine is estimated at 10-6 (Fenner et al., 
1988). The residual immunity for individuals by the 
number of vaccinations is estimated in Table 3. 
 
2.4 Population structure of the targeted area 
In this article, we simulated a situation of a smallpox 
epidemic in a city with a population of 10,000 attacked 
by smallpox, where the demographic data was referenced 
from the census data of Okayama-city, Japan 
(Okayama-City, 2007). The age distributions of males and 
females are shown in Fig. 3 (Okayama-City, 2007). The 
ratio of males and females was assumed to be equal. 
Each individual is classified into one of four roles, 
namely, worker, student, health care worker (HCW), or 
non-worker. The ratio of the above roles in the census 
data are 68%, 10%, 2%, and 20%, respectively (Table 4) 
(Okayama-City, 2007). We assumed that there were three 
 
 
Fig. 2 The model scheme for transmission dynamics  
of smallpox. 
Table 1 The infectiousness of smallpox (Burke et al., 2006). 
Infectious parameter Value 
Base 0.07 
Ordinary multiplier 1.00 
Modified multiplier 0.33 
Hemorrhagic multiplier 5.00 
Days (+ incubation period) Value 
~1 0.0 
2 1.0*base*multiplier
3 2.0*base*multiplier
4～9 4.0*base*multiplier
10～14 2.0*base*multiplier
15～ 0.0 
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kinds of households: single, couple, and couple with a 
child, and the ratio of households was also referenced 
from the census data, as shown in Table 5. 
The numbers of social settings in the targeted area were 
also determined from the census data (Table 6) 
(Okayama-City, 2007). We assumed that all workers, 
students, and HCWs go back and forth between home 
and workplace, school, or hospital each day, respectively, 
and that non-workers spend the whole day in home. We 
assumed that the infectiousness of smallpox was 
proportional to the relative force of infection in each 
social setting as compared with the force of infection in 
hospital (Table 7) (Halloran et al., 2007). 
 
Time of vaccination Residual immunity subclass Efficacy of vaccination Proportion 
Susceptible 
A 
full protection 97% 
modified 3% 
B 
full protection 99% 
modified 1% 
C full protection 100% 
4 days after infection 
A 
full protection 90% 
modified 10% 
B 
full protection 95% 
modified 5% 
C full protection 100% 
5-7 days after infection 
A 
ordinary 38% 
modified 60% 
hemorrhagic 2% 
B 
full protection 10% 
ordinary 20% 
modified 70% 
C 
full protection 20% 
ordinary 10% 
modified 90% 
From 8th day after infection  ineffectiveness 
Table 2 Efficacy of vaccination. 
Table 3 The effectiveness of vaccination due to residual immunity. 
Susceptibility class Full protection Ordinary Modified Hemorrhagic 
A 0% 95% 0% 5% 
B 0% 66% 30% 4% 
C 10% 30% 57% 3% 
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2.5 Control strategies 
The scenarios were framed by both Traced Vaccination 
(TV) and Mass Vaccination (MV) strategies. In the TV 
strategy, persons who came into contact with patients are 
traced (Center for Disease Control, 2001), but the tracing of 
contacts of contacts of patients was not considered 
(secondary contacts). The advantage of the TV strategy is 
its capability to vaccinate persons who have a chance of 
infection. However, it has the disadvantage of the time 
and labor consumed in tracing. On the other hand, in the 
MV strategy, people in the area of an outbreak of 
smallpox patients are vaccinated. In this article, it is 
assumed that a targeted area is divided equally into 
several MV-blocks, and that the execution of the 
vaccination program in another MV-block begins after 
completion of vaccination of all people in the current 
MV-block. The advantage of the MV strategy is that it is 
        
(a) (b) 
Figure 3 Age structure in the targeted area [9]. (a) male, (b) female. 
 Table 7 Relative force of infection per social setting. 
Social setting Relative force of infection
Household 0.9 
School 0.8 
Workplace 0.7 
Hospital 1.0 
 
Table 4 Roles. 
Role Age Ratio a 
Worker 16～ 68％ 
Student 5～ 10％ 
HCW 22～ 2％ 
Non-worker ～4 , 16～ 20％ 
Total - 100% 
a Refer to (Okayama-City, 2007) 
 Table 6 Number of social settings in the targeted area. 
Social setting Number a 
School
Kindergarten 8 
Elementary 9 
Junior high 4 
High 3 
College 1 
Workplace 450 
Hospital 1 
a Refer to (Okayama-City, 2007)  
Size Age Ratio a 
Single 18~ 35％ 
Couple 20~ 20％ 
Couple with a child 
couple：20~ 
child：（average of age of couple）－（age of child）൒20 
45％ 
Total - 100% 
a Refer to  (Okayama-City, 2007) 
Table 5 Structure of household. 
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capable of vaccinating a large number of people. 
However, it demands a lot of vaccines for complete use 
of the MV strategy. It is assumed that the number of 
doses of vaccine that can be administered per hour in MV 
strategy is in proportion to the number of HCWs. For full 
details of the tracing time required, tracing rate, the 
number of doses of vaccine per hour for the MV strategy, 
and coverage for MV refer to Scenarios. 
 
2.6 Scenarios 
2.6.1 Baseline scenario 
We carried out simulations on the basis of various 
scenarios. The base scenario was as follows. 
Ten index patients are introduced into a social setting 
chosen at random. The behavior patterns of patients are 
set in Table 8, which is referenced from Longini et al. 
(2007). On the second day of fever, 47.5% of ordinary 
type patients withdraw to home, and another 47.5% go to 
hospital, and remaining 5% maintain normal behavior. 
On the other hand, 25% of modified type patients 
withdraw to home, another 25% go to hospital, and 
remaining 50% maintain normal behavior, but all 
hemorrhagic type patients go to hospital. On the fourth 
day of fever, all patients visit a hospital. When an index 
patient visits a hospital, all HCWs in the hospital are 
vaccinated according to priority. A one-third of HCWs 
are occupied in dosing persons. One HCW can dose 6 
persons per hour. Any patients who visit to hospital are 
quarantined. There is no limit in the quarantining 
capacity. 
 
2.6.2 Scenarios 
We prepared the following 10 scenarios. 
(1) Baseline scenario. 
(2) Scenario (1) plus TV strategy. In this scenario, we 
assume that the necessary trace time is 24 hours, 
trace rates in household and social settings are 0.9 
and 0.7, respectively. TV strategy starts five days 
after the first patient was identified by HCWs. 
(3) Only the necessary trace time changes from 24 hours 
to 48 hours compared with scenario (2). 
(4) Only the necessary trace time changes from 24 hours 
to 72 hours compared with scenario (2). 
(5) Pattern 1 and pattern 2 in Table 8 are simultaneously 
delayed for 1 day compared with scenario (2). 
(6) Pattern 1 and pattern 2 in Table 8 are simultaneously 
delayed for 2 days compared with scenario (2). 
(7) Scenario (1) plus MV strategy. In this scenario, a 
targeted area is divided into five MV-blocks. The 
coverage of MV is set at 0.8, and the number of 
doses of vaccine per hour for MV is assumed to be 
five times that in scenario (1). 
(8) The division number of blocks in the targeted area 
changes 5 with 10 compared with scenario (7). 
(9) The coverage of MV changes from 0.8 to 0.5 
compared with scenario (7). 
(10)  Both TV and MV are performed simultaneously 
using the conditions of scenario (3) and scenario (8) 
 
Table 8 Behavior patterns of patients (Longini et al., 2007). 
Type 
2nd and 3rd day of Fever
（Pattarn1） 
4th day of Fever（Pattarn2） 
Action Probability  
Ordinary 
Go to hospital 47.5％ 
All patients go to hospital 
Withdraw to home 47.5％ 
Normal behavior 5％ 
Modified 
Go to hospital 25％ 
Withdraw to home 25％ 
Normal behavior 50％ 
Hemorrhagic Go to hospital 100％ 
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3 Results 
 
We carried out 100-trial simulations for 100 days for the 
10 Scenarios. Table 9 shows the average numbers of total 
infections, total deaths, total doses of vaccine with 95% 
confidence interval, and the eradication percentage 
within 100 days in the 10 scenarios. Fig. 4 shows the 
transition of smallpox incidence and the 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
4 Discussions 
 
We carried out simulations of various scenarios of a 
bioterrorist attack using smallpox occurring in a virtual 
area (population size 10,000) set up on the basis of the 
census of Okayama-city, Japan, which predict the effect 
of control strategies against bioterrorism and the loss 
scale. 
Firstly, we investigated the effect of TV and MV 
strategies (scenarios (2) and (7)) on the suppression of a 
smallpox epidemic by comparison with a no-control 
baseline (scenario (1)). In the no-control baseline 
scenario (1), we showed that the average number of total 
infections and deaths amount to 933.1 and 241.5, 
respectively, and that only 45% of trials resulted in 
eradication within 100 days. The TV (scenario (2)) 
reduced the average number of total infections and deaths 
to 30% and 10% compared with the no-control scenario 
(scenario (1)), and eradicated the smallpox epidemic 
within 100 days in all 100 trials. While the MV strategy 
(scenario (7)) reduced the average number of total 
infections and deaths only to 73% and 69% compared  
Table 9 Results of simulations in 10 scenarios. 
Scenario 
Average number of 
total infections 
(95％ CI) 
Average number of 
total deaths 
(95％ CI) 
Average number of 
doses of vaccine 
(95％ CI) 
Percentage of 
eradication within 
100 days 
(1) 
933.1 
(685.5-1180.6) 
241.5 
(185.9-297.2) 
1067.8 
(859.0-1276.5) 
48% 
(2) 
268.0 
(193.5-342.5) 
24.7 
(20.7-28.7) 
1233.0 
(1024.3-1441.6) 
100% 
(3) 
314.1 
(240.7-387.4) 
25.1 
(20.2-30.0) 
1440.7 
(1244.6-1656.7) 
100% 
(4) 
406.1 
(308.7-503.5) 
35.19 
(28.5-41.8) 
1612.9 
(1379.1-1846.8) 
100% 
(5) 
483.6 
(388.8-578.4) 
47.5 
(36.5-58.5) 
2361.3 
(2126.4-2596.1) 
95% 
(6) 
656.3 
(527.7-784.9) 
104.0 
(84.3-123.6) 
2835.3 
(2585.1-3085.4) 
65% 
(7) 
680.2 
(506.2-854.2) 
165.9 
(125.1-216.7) 
2799.1 
(2627.3-2970.9) 
59% 
(8) 
715.2 
(525.8-904.6) 
189.0 
(138.4-239.6) 
1855.7 
(1667.4-2043.9) 
56% 
(9) 
740.3 
(569.4-921.1) 
204.7 
(156.2-253.3) 
2710.6 
(2553.2-2868.1) 
52% 
(10) 
267.5 
(199.7-335.3) 
23.8 
(18.9-28.6) 
3268 
(3001.9-3534.2) 
100% 
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(1) (2) 
(3) (4) 
(5) (6) 
Fig. 4 Transition of smallpox incidence in scenarios 
 (1)-(10) correspond to scenarios (1)-(10). Solid, dashed, and broken lines show the average number of 
infections, upper limit, and lower limit of 95% confidence intervals in 100 simulations. 
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with the no-control scenario (scenario (1)), and 
eradicated the outbreak within 100 days in only 59 trials. 
Therefore, it is confirmed that only quarantining patients 
(scenario (1)) is incapable of suppressing the smallpox 
epidemic, whereas the TV strategy (scenario (2)) has 
high effectiveness in suppressing the outbreak, and that 
the TV strategy has higher effectiveness than the MV 
strategy.  
Secondly, we investigated the influence of the span of 
necessary tracing time for TV on suppression of the 
smallpox epidemic (scenarios (2)-(4)). The average 
numbers of the total infections for necessary tracing 
times of 48 and 72 hours (scenarios (3) and (4)) increased 
to 314.1 (117%) and 406.1 (150%) compared with 268.0 
in the scenario for 24 hours (scenario (2)), although both 
TV strategies with 48 and 72 hours tracing times 
(scenarios (3) and (4)) obtained eradication of the 
outbreaks within 100 days (100%). Consequently, it is 
desirable that for an effective TV strategy tracing is 
begun within 48 hours.  
Thirdly, we investigated the influence of the size of 
MV-blocks on suppression (scenarios (7) and (8)). In MV 
with an area that is divided into five MV-blocks (scenario 
(7)) the average number of total infections and deaths 
was reduced to 95% and 91% compared with MV with 
ten MV-blocks (scenario (8)), and could eradicate the 
smallpox epidemic within 100 days in 59 trials, while the 
ten-blocks MV strategy (scenario (8)) achieved this in 
only 56 trials. Therefore, there is little difference in 
suppression between the two sizes of MV-blocks.  
Fourthly, we investigated the influence of coverage of 
MV on suppression of the outbreaks (scenarios (7) and 
(9)). MV with 50% coverage (scenario (9)) increased the 
average number of total infections and deaths to 108% 
and 123% compared with MV with 80% coverage 
(scenario (7)), and it could eradicate the smallpox 
epidemic within 100 days in only 52 trials, while the MV 
strategy with 50% coverage (scenario (9)) could 
eradicate it within 100 days in only 59 trials. A large 
amount of time is consumed in vaccinating in a block 
because of the low coverage for MV. Therefore, a low 
coverage MV strategy (scenario (9)) prolongs the term of 
a smallpox epidemic.  
Fifthly, we compared the effect of TV and simultaneous 
TV and MV strategies on suppression of the outbreak 
(scenarios (2) and (10)). The simultaneous performance 
(9) (10) 
(7) (8) 
Fig. 4 (continued) 
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of TV and MV (scenario (10)) had about the same results 
on the average numbers of total infections and deaths and 
the same result (100%) on the eradication probability 
within 100 days as the performance of only TV. However, 
these analogous results should be attributed to the lower 
effectiveness of the MV strategy. We may expect a better 
result if the effectiveness of the MV strategy can be 
improved. The number of total doses of vaccine in 
scenario (10) is about 2000 more than in scenario (2). 
Although deaths due to side effects of the vaccine occur 
rarely, even with a small fatality rate (10-6) this effect will 
become significant when MV is operated for a larger 
population. Hence, only TV that vaccinates contacts is 
recommended as a control strategy, unless the 
effectiveness of the MV strategy can be further 
improved.  
Finally, we investigated the influence of behavior 
pattern of patients on suppression of the outbreak 
(scenarios (2), (5), and (6)). The delay case for 1 day of 
behavior pattern of patients in Table 8 (scenario (5)) 
increases the average number of total infections and 
deaths 180% and 190% compared with the no-delay case 
(scenario (2)), and could eradicate the smallpox epidemic 
within 100 days in 95 trials. While the delay case of 
behavior patterns of patients in Table 8 for 2 days 
(scenario (6)) increased the average number of total 
infections and deaths to 240% and 420% compared with 
the no-delay case (scenario (2)), and could eradicate the 
smallpox epidemic within 100 days in only 65 trials. 
Quick hospitalization of patient is proven to have a good 
influence on the control smallpox epidemics, because 
infections increase less rapidly under effective quarantine 
conditions. 
The comparative studies in scenarios (1)-(10) 
demonstrate the high effectiveness of the TV strategy and 
the lower effectiveness of the MV strategy. We show that 
the TV strategy has an advantage with regard to side 
effects of the vaccine, because TV (scenario (2)) reduces 
the required number of total doses of vaccine by half 
compared with the MV (scenario (7)). There were two 
reasons why the MV strategy was less effectiveness. 
Firstly, if patients leave a MV-block before MV is carried 
out, the smallpox epidemic could leak out. As a 
countermeasure, MV-blocks can be fixed by the prospect 
of behavior patterns of patients. Secondly, it takes too 
much time to vaccinate all persons in a MV-block. As a 
consequence of a precondition in the model that 
vaccination moves to the next block only after 
vaccination of all persons in the present block is finished, 
there is prevalence for the infection to spread out before 
vaccination. To avoid excessively strict preconditions, we 
set a time limit on vaccination in a MV-block when 
vaccination in MV is dosed. 
We adopted IBM in order that individuals have personal 
information about age and address, behavior patterns 
such as movement between home and workplace, and 
interaction among social groups, which can make the 
model realistic. However, a behavior pattern that consists 
of a movement between home and workplace and a visit 
to hospital is monotonic. It will be necessary to introduce 
more complicated behavior patterns to make the model 
more realistic. In the model, the incubation period and 
the infectiousness depend on three severity types: 
ordinary, modified, and hemorrhagic types, and also the 
infectiousness and the severity depend on the residual 
immunity due to past vaccination, where there are three 
stages in residual immunity. However, it is not yet clear 
how much residual immunity remains (Nishiura et al., 
2006). Further refinement of this research is being 
developed from our basic research. 
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